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Upon the recent finalization of the Singapore Mediation Convention, a comparative analysis is conducted in the article 
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Tarptautinių mediacijos būdu pasiektų susitarimų priverstinis vykdymas
Atsižvelgiant į neseniai baigtą rengti Singapūro mediacijos konvencijos tekstą, straipsnyje pateikiama lyginamoji nau-
josios konvencijos bei šiuo metu galiojančių ES mediacijos direktyvos ir SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb protokolų analizė, 
nagrinėjant tarptautinių mediacijos būdų pasiektų susitarimų priverstinio vykdymo galimybes.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: mediacija, mediacijos būdų pasiekti susitarimai, Singapūro mediacijos konvencija, ES mediacijos 
direktyva, SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb protokolas.
Introduction
In mediation, as opposed to arbitration or litigation, disputants come to a consensus, rather than have 
a decision imposed by a third party. The fact that parties have to agree on every provision of their me-
diated settlement agreement (hereinafter – MSA) increases the chances of a voluntary implementation. 
However, not all the disputants are willing to commit to their words. The more cases appear where 
parties had to spend time, money and effort to settle a dispute and, later on, were exposed to litigation 
over the same matter, the less reliable mediation becomes. Thus, not only the parties acting in good 
faith are negatively affected by the circumvented settlement agreements, but also the mediation com-
munity in general. In order to avoid such scenario, proper mechanisms for enforcement of mediated 
settlement agreements have to be introduced.
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Up to this day two main mechanisms to enforce international MSAs could be found1. The first one, 
offered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter – SIAC) – Singapore International 
Mediation Centre (hereinafter – SIMC) Arb-Med-Arb2 Protocol3 relies on the framework created for 
enforcement of arbitral awards (i.e. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards4 (hereinafter – the New York Convention). The second one, offered by the 
European Union (hereinafter – the EU) Mediation Directive5, is based on enforcement mechanisms 
created by national legislators themselves. As will be discussed further in the article, none of the two 
can solve the problem of international enforcement of MSAs in its entirety.
In June 2018 UNICTRAL approved6 two international instruments intended to provide states with 
consistent standards on cross-border enforcement of international MSAs7: The Draft Amended Model 
Law8 and The Draft Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation9 
(hereinafter – the Singapore Mediation Convention10). It has been chosen to prepare both to accom-
modate the different levels of experience with mediation in different jurisdictions. The content of the 
two documents is relatively similar thus, only the text of the convention will be analysed in detail 
further in the article.
Upon the finalisation of the article, there was no significant scientific literature analysing the provi-
sions and possible effects of the Singapore Mediation Convention neither in Lithuania nor internationally, 
as the convention was just adopted. However, national mediation regimes were introduced earlier, and 
authors such as Klaus J. Hopt, Felix Steffek, Manon and Fred Schonewille have all researched and 
described these national regulations of mediation in different countries. Their work formed the basis 
for the overview of the national enforcement regimes covered in chapter 1 of the article.
Since the Singapore Mediation Convention is supposed to offer a universal solution, the goal of this 
article is to evaluate if its provisions create a mechanism which is capable of outperforming existing 
enforcement mechanisms provided in the SIAC – SIMC Arb-Med-Arb protocol and the EU Mediation 
Directive. These three legal acts form the main object of the article. In order to achieve the goal stated 
above, the following tasks had to be carried out: (1) description of the three procedures mentioned, 
specifying their differences and similarities; (2) comparing the procedures in order to identify their 
1  QUEK ANDERSON, D. Litigation over Mediation – How Should the Courts Enforce Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, p. 129.
2  Arbitration-Mediation-Arbitration. 
3  SIAC – SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol [e-version], 2014 [accessed 2018-03-19]. Available at: <http://simc.com.sg/
siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol/>.
4  UNCITRAL Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [e-version]. New York, 
1958 [accessed 2018-03-16]. Available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.
html>.
5  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of medi-
ation in Civil and Commercial matters, OJ, L-136, 2008, p. 3–8 (hereinafter – Mediation Directive), art. 6.
6  UNCITRAL. Sound recordings of 51st session. New York, 2018 [accessed 2018-07-25]. Available at: <http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp>.
7  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 [e-version]. New York, 2018 [acces-
sed 2018-08-20]. Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V18/012/07/PDF/V1801207.
pdf?OpenElement>.
8  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/943 [e-version]. New York, 2018 [acces-
sed 2018-08-20]. Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V18/012/01/PDF/V1801201.
pdf?OpenElement>.
9  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, para. 25.
10  Singapore suggested to host the signing ceremony and hence, following the model of the New York Convention, 
abbreviated version of the name was anchored to Singapore Mediation Convention. 
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advantages and disadvantages; (3) indicating reasons why certain methods might work in one environ-
ment but not another. To fulfil these tasks comparative research method was implemented. Teleological 
and document analysis methods were also widely used while examining travaux preparatoire and final 
texts of the legal acts. 
1. National MSAs’ Enforcement Mechanisms
International MSAs’ enforcement mechanisms, which will be discussed further in the article, do not 
create a uniform enforcement system or an international enforcement body. They oblige contracting 
states or the Member States (depends on the instrument) to ensure that an international MSA will be 
enforced in accordance with the rules and procedure of the country where enforcement is sought. Hence, 
an international mechanism can only be successful if there are functioning enforcement mechanisms 
on the national level.
Legislators in the EU Member States have tackled the problem of the enforcement of MSAs well – 
every country has a mechanism how to transform an MSA into a directly enforceable title. In the most 
of them MSAs are subject to homologation by a public authority11. An MSA can be filed in a court for 
summary proceedings (e. g. in Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania12), enacted in an enforceable notarial 
deed (e. g. in Austria, Belgium13), validated by a mediation body (e. g. Estonia14), transferred into an 
arbitral consent award (e. g. Austria, Germany15). Many Member States offer several methods named 
above for the parties to choose from. In some Member States, MSAs are directly enforceable, if their 
provisions go in accordance with formal requirements or if an MSA has an enforceability clause in-
cluded (e. g. Croatia, Portugal16).
Outside the EU situation varies significantly. Quite a few jurisdictions also offer to transform an 
MSA into a judgement on agreed terms for it to become directly enforceable (e. g. Israel17, New Zealand, 
Japan18). Others provide this option only for court mediation or in cases where a motion with regards 
to the dispute in question is filed in a court (e. g. China19, Brazil, India, Singapore20). In these countries 
enforcement of out-of-court MSAs, even though possible under certain conditions (such as transforming 
it into an arbitrary consent award), is burdensome. As well as in the EU countries, instances can be 
found of rendering MSAs directly enforceable by a notary deed (e. g. Japan21), approval of conciliation 
authority (e. g. Switzerland22). However, a notable number of countries (even though, not the leading 
11  The European Parliament. Resolution of 12 September 2017 on the implementation of Directive 2008/52/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters (the ‘Mediation Directive’) (2016/2066(INI)) [e-version. Accessed 2018-04-09]. Available at: <http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0238+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>, p. 9.
12  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated Landscape of Mediation. The Hague: Eleven International Publis-
hing, 2014, p. 230, 243, 205 (accordingly). 
13  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 55, 67 (accordingly). 
14  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 134.
15  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 55, 175 (accordingly). 
16  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 94, 310 (accordingly).
17  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 642.
18  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013, p. 1110, 1048 (accordingly).
19  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 973.
20  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 538, 615, 687 (accordingly).
21  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 1048.
22  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 1217.
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players in the mediation community) do not have any mechanism to transform an MSA into a directly 
enforceable title (e. g. Cambodia, Lebanon, South Africa23). Thus, instead of a formal homologation, 
parties have to go through full-length litigation and enforce an MSA as any other contract.
Federal countries, such as the USA, Australia or Canada have different standards across the states. 
The USA has abandoned a proposal to introduce a uniform rule for expedited enforcement of an MSA 
at the final stage24 of the adoption of the U.S. Uniform Mediation Act25. Neither Canada nor Australia 
had such harmonisation attempts with regards to expedited enforcement of MSAs. While some indi-
vidual states offer summary proceedings to render MSAs enforceable, it is not true throughout all the 
federal territories.
As seen from the data above, most of the national jurisdictions that provide a way to transfer an 
MSA into enforceable title chose to subject it to the scrutiny of an authoritative figure. A homologation 
before rendering an MSA directly enforceable on the grounds of public order and the mandatory law is 
encouraged for three reasons. First, parties are free to include in their MSA what they feel fit. Reaching 
a consensus does not always mean that its particularities go in accordance with the mandatory law. 
Second, only several jurisdictions26 have a mandatory requirement for legal representation during me-
diation. Third, mediators are not required to have a legal background. Some jurisdictions even forbid 
mediators to give legal advice27. However, full-length litigation over a dispute which has already been 
settled is not a plausible outcome. Even though in most jurisdictions MSA is regarded as a contract, at 
the same time it is the result of a dispute resolution process, thus should be treated differently. Hence, 
countries that do not provide any expedited MSAs’ enforcement mechanism or countries that offer 
such procedure only for court mediations have room for improvement.
Summing up, national approaches towards rendering MSAs directly enforceable vary. While some 
countries offer direct enforceability or at least summary proceedings to transform an MSA into a 
judgement, others can only suggest filing a motion in court if obligations of an MSA are not fulfilled. 
The Member States of the EU were obliged to ensure that there exists an enforcement mechanism of 
cross-border MSAs by the article 6 of the Mediation Directive28. However, such an obligation does not 
exist worldwide. It might impede adoption or successful functioning of an international instrument, 
which is based on national provisions. 
2. SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol
In 2014 SIAC and SIMC introduced the Arb-Med-Arb protocol29 seizing an opportunity to benefit 
from an international instrument already in place – the New York Convention. Many national laws 
23  SCHONEWILLE, M., et. al. The Variegated <…>, p. 555, 660, 697 (accordingly).
24  SUSSMAN, E. The Final Step: Issues in Enforcing the Mediation Settlement Agreement [e-version], from Ford-
ham Law School Conference on International Arbitration and Mediation, New York, 2008 [accessed: 2018-08-17]. Avai-
lable at: <https://sussmanadr.com/docs/Enforcement_Fordham_82008.pdf>, p. 5–6.
25  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Mediation Act [e-version]. White 
Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, 2001 [accessed 2018-08-17]. Available at: <http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/me-
diation/uma_final_03.pdf>.
26  For example, Italy and Greece.
27  For example, Bulgaria. See HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 356.
28  Mediation Directive, art. 6.
29  SIAC – SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol [e-version], 2014 [accessed 2018-03-19]. Available at: <http://simc.com.sg/
siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol/>.
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on arbitration30, as well as UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration31, allow 
arbitration institutions to issue a consent award recording the terms of the settlement reached by the 
parties to the dispute32. The most prominent arbitration institutions’ rules also support the possibility of 
transforming a settlement agreement into a consent award33. Such award acquires the status of a final 
award and therefore can be enforced under the rules of the New York Convention. The Convention 
is 60-year-old and has the confidence of more than 150 contracting states34. Hence, no further global 
consensus is needed to render international MSAs enforceable in other countries.
Arb-Med-Arb protocol offers a three-phase procedure. First, the dispute is brought in front of an 
arbitration institution (SIAC) where a tribunal is constituted. Second, the arbitration proceedings are 
stayed immediately, and the dispute is then transferred to mediation (SIMC) for an amicable resolution. 
Third, when the settlement is reached, the process is shifted back to arbitration (SIAC) to be recorded 
as a consent award or, in case a dispute was not settled, to be arbitrated.
The reason why the procedure has to be formally started in arbitration is related to the wording 
of the New York Convention. Article 1 states that the ‘Convention shall apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards <…> arising out of differences between persons <…>’. With rare ex-
ceptions35 scholars and practitioners36 agree that if a dispute is started in mediation and settled there, 
by the time an MSA reaches arbitration to be transformed into a consent award there are no longer any 
differences between persons. Therefore, such consent award falls outside the scope of the New York 
Convention and cannot be enforced. Starting the procedure in arbitration, even though only formally, 
solves this problem.
For those, who genuinely intend to continue the resolution process in arbitration if mediation is not 
successful, such a three-phased approach is convenient. However, not all the parties have an intention 
to arbitrate even when their attempt to mediate fails37. For latter as well as the ones whose sole reason 
for choosing Arb-Med-Arb is enforcement of an MSA, formal proceedings in arbitration only add 
costs and consumes more time.
SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb protocol is an excellent example of a creative approach of rendering 
MSAs enforceable using the instruments already in force. However, instead of targeting the root cause 
of the problem, it is merely a way around. Using a convention that was not intended to include mediated 
30  E. g. Republic of Lithuania Law on Commercial Arbitration. Valstybės žinios, 2012, no. 76-3932, art. 47; German 
Code of Civil Procedure (as amended and supplemented to date). Bundesgesetzblatt, 2005, I page 3202; art. 1053.
31  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985. With amendments as adopted in 2006 
[e-version]. New York, 2006 [accessed 2018-03-18]. Available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-arb/07-86998 _Ebook.pdf>, art. 30. 
32  KRYVOI, Y.; DAVYDENKO, D. Consent Awards in International Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 
Brooklyn Journal on International Law, 2015, vol. 40 (3), p. 832.
33  See for example: ICC. Rules of Arbitration [e-version. Accessed 2018-08-15]. Available at: <https://iccwbo.org/
dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/>, art. 32; Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce. Arbitration Rules [e-version]. 2017 [accessed 2018-08-15]. Available at: <https://sccinstitute.com/me-
dia/169838/arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf, art. 45; London Court of International Arbitration. Arbitration Rules 
[e-version]. 2014 [accessed 2018-08-15]. Available at: http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-
rules-2014.aspx##>, art. 26.9.
34  See: <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> [accessed 2018-05-28].
35  Some do not see a problem in such wording – in their eyes the provision does not prohibit in itself to enforce 
such agreements and therefore it should be possible. See: AMBRASON, H. Mining Mediation Rules for Representation 
Opportunities and Obstacles, American Review of International Arbitration, 2004, vol. 103, p. 108. 
36  For example, see: BOOG, C. The New SIAC/SIMC AMA-Protocol: A Seamless Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution 
Process Tailored to the User’s Needs. Asian Dispute Review, 2015, vol. 2015 (2) p. 92.
37  KRYVOI, Y.; DAVYDENKO, D. Consent Awards <…> p. 833.
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settlement agreements into its scope adds superfluous procedural steps. Therefore, Arb-Med-Arb is 
considered to be good, however, short-term solution to the problem. 
3. Enforcement Mechanisms in the European Union
The problem of the enforcement of MSAs is relatively small in the EU38. It was tackled by the Article 6 
of the Mediation Directive, which obliges the Member States to ensure that written agreements resulting 
from mediation would be made enforceable under a request of the parties. The Mediation Directive 
did not create a uniform system. It leaves the choice of the form and the competent authority to the 
Member States. However, the Article 6 suggests that the content of an MSA may be made enforceable 
by a court or other competent authority in a judgment or decision or in an authentic instrument. As 
explained above, this advice was followed by the EU Member States. The fact that all of them have 
introduced some kind of expedited proceedings could have added significantly to the success of the 
enforcement mechanism of MSAs in the EU.
The wording of the Article 6 is no novelty. The foundation for such model was established together 
with the Brussels Convention and remained in the regulations that succeeded it39. Brussels I bis40, 
Brussels II bis41 and the European Enforcement Order42 regulations, in addition to court judgements 
and decisions, envisage two additional types of enforceable documents, namely court settlements43, 
and authentic instruments44. Both of them could have served as means for rendering MSAs enforceable 
even before implementation of the Directive. The Mediation Directive itself refers to Brussels I and II 
bis regulations, as a possible basis for rendering MSAs enforceable45. Thus, even though mediation is 
a relatively novel instrument in the EU, the enforcement mechanism of MSAs was built on previous 
regulations and conventions, and the trust between the Member states was already established.
There are only a few requirements foreseen in the Mediation Directive for MSAs to fall inside the 
scope of the Article 6 and consequently be subject to the enforcement in another Member State. First, 
an agreement shall be in writing and resulting from mediation in a cross-border dispute. Second, the 
request for making an MSA enforceable should be made by all the parties to the dispute or by one of 
them with the explicit consent of others. Third, an MSA should not establish grounds for refusal. Hence, 
38  PAPPAS, B. A. Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Harvard Negotiation Law Re-
view, 2015, vol. 20, p. 169.
39  HILL, J.; CHONG, A. International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010. Chapter 13.5.
40  The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ, L-351, 2012, p. 1–32. 
(hereinafter – Brussels I bis).
41  The Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000, OJ, L-338, 2003, p. 1–29 (hereinafter – Brussels II bis).
42  The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) 805/2004 creating a European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ, L-143, 2004, p. 15–39 (hereinafter European Enforcement Order regu-
lation).
43  Brussels I bis, art. 59; European Enforcement Order regulation, art. 24; Brussels II bis, art. 46. 
44  Brussels I bis, art. 2 (c), art. 58; European Enforcement Order regulation, art. 4 (3), art. 25; Brussels II bis art. 46. 
Authentic instruments were primarily designated to include notarised agreements into the scope of regulations, however, 
they can be used in a wider capacity. See: HESS, B. et al. Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States: study JLS/C4/2005/03 [e-version]. Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2007 [accessed 2018-04-07]. Available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf>, p. 66.
45  The Mediation Directive, para. 20. 
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the content of an MSA cannot be contrary to the law of the Member State where the enforcement is 
sought, and the law of that Member State has to provide for enforceability of such content. According 
to the Commission’s report, the Article 6 of the Mediation Directive was implemented effectively 
across the Member states46. Thus, the requirements for MSAs are sufficient for the EU enforcement 
mechanism to work. However, some improvements could be made.
First, the Directive does not provide any standards how to prove that an agreement is resulting from 
mediation (e. g. would a mediator’s signature on an MSA suffice; should there be an official statement 
from the mediation provider). It is not essential if a Member State treats all the settlement agreements 
in the same manner. However, for parties, seeking enforcement in countries where a particular regime 
is applied solely to MSAs, some guidance or an example list would be useful.
Second, requiring an additional consent after an MSA was concluded in writing gives the unwilling 
party an opportunity to back out. The voluntariness of the mediation process shall not be understood as 
giving the disputants an indefinite amount of time to change their minds after signing an MSA47. The 
practice of some Member States proves that such an additional requirement is not necessary. As stated 
in the Commission’s report, ‘Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy do not explicitly require 
the consent of all parties to the dispute for a request for the enforceability of the mediation agreement. 
In Greece and Slovakia, an enforceability request can be made by one of the parties without explicit 
consent from the others48’. In Poland, by signing the agreement, parties give their consent to request 
the court’s approval for enforcement49. Thus, no additional consent is needed. If consent is still to be 
required, it would be wiser to include it into an MSA itself.
The Article 6 of the Mediation Directive is a concise, yet effective cross-border MSAs’ enforce-
ment mechanism. Even though it could be improved on two bases, it is working for the EU Member 
States. However, reflecting the exact wording of the Article 6 in an international instrument might 
not be enough for it to be successful. The relatively recent Mediation Directive was built on a solid 
foundation of Brussels regulations which were in place for decades and helped establish trust between 
the Member States. Moreover, all of the Member States have an expedited procedure for enforcement 
of MSAs, which is not always the case outside the EU. Hence, the Mediation Directive could be used 
as a good example for international MSAs enforcement mechanism, if possible pitfalls are tackled. 
4. UNCITRAL: the Singapore Mediation Convention
The Singapore Mediation Convention is a result of international negotiations that lasted almost four 
years. Differing levels of national regulation and development of mediation have led to a difficult start of 
the negotiation. It posed the whole process in danger of being abandoned in its early phase50. However, 
46  European Commission. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [e-version]. Brussels, 2016 [accessed: 2018-04-
10]. Accessible via the Internet: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0542&fr
om=EN>, p. 9.
47  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 45.
48  European Commission. Report from the Commission <…> p. 9.
49  Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Poland (as amended and supplemented to date). Dziennik Ustaw, 1964, 
No 43-296, art. 18312 (2).
50  SCHNABEL, T. The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and 
Enforcement of Mediated Settlements [e-version. Not yet published], 2018 [Accessed 2018-09-01]. Available at: <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239527>, p. 4.
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negotiators managed to come to a consensus. Such consensus also meant that some provisions had to 
be adapted in order to get a green light from certain countries or organisations for other provisions to 
be included in the text of the Convention. It allowed having the Convention finalised, however, caused 
a few potential flaws of the document. The regulation model agreed in the Convention is described 
below together with a brief explanation on what could have been improved.
The regulation model provided in the Convention is based on national provisions and is therefore 
relatively similar to the one stipulated in the Mediation Directive. The general principles of the Singa-
pore Mediation Convention are twofold: ensuring that contracting states (1) enforce MSAs according 
to their rules of procedure and (2) allow parties to invoke an MSA proving that a matter was already 
resolved in case a dispute over the same issue arises51. To be subject to the enforcement under the 
Singapore Mediation Convention, an agreement has to be international, concluded in writing, signed 
by the parties and resulting from mediation. Unlike the Mediation Directive, the Convention obliges 
parties to provide evidence that this is indeed true. The evidence could be a mediator’s signature on the 
agreement; a separate attestation from the mediator or the institution that administered the mediation or 
other evidence, if the ones mentioned above are not available. Allowing one of the parties to request for 
the enforcement of an MSA without the explicit consent of the other is subject to the national proced-
ure of the contracting state. However, contracting states can choose to apply the Singapore Mediation 
Convention only if the parties to the dispute have agreed on that52.
The scope of the Convention is limited to the MSAs arising out of international commercial 
disputes. However, it could have been wider. Disputes regarding consumers or relating to family, 
inheritance, and employment law were excluded from the scope. This decision was made to ensure 
that possible power imbalance between the parties to these kinds of disputes will not deter states from 
becoming parties to the Convention53. Moreover, MSAs (1) approved by a court or concluded in the 
course of court proceedings, and enforceable as a judgment in the state of that court; or (2) recorded 
and enforceable as an arbitral award; were also excluded from the scope. The latter exclusion was 
inserted to avoid creating an overlap with existing and foreseen enforcement frameworks for arbitral 
awards54 and judgements55. However, trying to avoid situations when a party to an MSA can choose 
from several instruments capable of accommodating the need for international enforcement of an MSA, 
parties might be left without any possibilities at all.
Allowing settlement agreements approved by a court or recorded as arbitral awards to fall inside 
the scope of the instruments would have been a better choice. First, some rightly emphasize that 
such overlap might be beneficial to the parties56 as they could choose an instrument which is more 
convenient in a given situation. Second, a competent authority (which is not necessarily a court57) of 
the state where enforcement is sought has to define if an MSA is enforceable in the state where it was 
approved by a court. Municipal settlement bodies58 or other national non-court institutions responsible 
51  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 4., art 3. 
52  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 6., art 8. (1) b.
53  SCHNABEL, T. The Singapore <…>, p. 19.
54  I. e. The New York Convention. 
55  I. e. Hague Conference on International Private Law: Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments. Draft Convention [e-version]. Hague, 2017 [accessed 2018-04-29]. Available at: <https://assets.hcch.
net/docs/2f0e08f1-c498-4d15-9dd4-b902ec3902fc.pdf>.
56  UNCITRAL General Assembly. Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) No. A/CN.9/901 [e-version]. 
New York, 2017 [accessed: 2018-04-29]. Available at: <http://undocs.org/A/CN.9/901> para. 64.
57  See chapter 1 of the article.
58  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 46.
Miglė Žukauskaitė. Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements
213
for enforcement of MSA are not necessarily experts in the international civil procedure. Thus, the 
risk of mistake is higher. Third, an MSA can be enforceable in the state of court proceedings and not 
in the state of enforcement. Hence, it would not be enforced at all. Fourth, some states might choose 
to become parties to the Singapore Mediation Convention and disregard the instruments of, for ex-
ample, the Hague. Thus, an MSA could not be enforced either. Fifth, the instruments for enforcement 
of judgements, arbitral awards or MSAs are not conflicting with each other59. Therefore, the overlap 
would not have caused harm or implementational problems. Such decision seems to be the result of an 
international compromise60, however, in this case, it can cause a potential drawback of the Convention.
The Singapore Mediation Convention offers a wide range of grounds for refusal to enforce an MSA. 
On the one hand, adding more safeguards can prevent unlawful agreements from being enforced. Hence, 
more states will be willing to become parties to the Convention. On the other hand, the Convention 
sets several grounds for refusal that require an in-depth analysis of the facts of the mediation. If these 
grounds were to be invoked frequently, it could render the Convention dysfunctional in practice. 
Therefore, they should have been omitted. There are several reasons for that.
First, analysing if an agreement is null and void, inoperative, incapable of being performed or if 
a party was under some incapacity61 can amount to enforcing an MSA as a simple contract through 
litigation in terms of time an effort. Second, the grounds related to the conduct of a mediator62 are 
repetitive and unnecessary. If the parties were indeed affected by the conduct of a mediator to such an 
extent that there was no consensus ad idem, an MSA would be null and void as a contract. Moreover, 
mediator, unlike a judge or an arbitrator, does not have a decisive power on the outcome. This reduces 
the need for such grounds to the minimum. Third, the actual control over the validity of an MSA and 
assessment of evidence is delegated to competent authorities, which, yet again, are not necessarily 
courts. Fourth, such grounds give the parties, who participated in the mediation and had an absolute 
right to leave when they felt mistreated, a way to abuse the process and, most importantly, try to escape 
or postpone their obligations63.
All the grounds for refusal mentioned above could be substituted to one recognizing that the 
process of granting relief should be stayed upon presentation of a proof that the fairness of the pro-
cess of mediation or validity of its outcome is challenged in front of a judicial authority having the 
jurisdiction over the substance of the matter. Relief should not be granted if the judicial authority in 
question renders a final decision that the mediation process was not fair, or the settlement agreement 
is not valid. This will incentivize parties to take active steps if they feel mistreated during mediation. 
It is likely that such wording could decrease the number of these claims, as it would deter parties who 
are merely trying to delay enforcement. At the same time, it could ensure that legal terms will be in-
terpreted in courts in accordance with the rules of international jurisdiction and not in the institutions 
having a different function.
It is not being argued that grounds for refusal to grant relief should be abolished entirely from the 
text. However, an excessive amount of them might render UNCITRAL instruments practically un-
workable as almost every attempt of speedy international enforcement would result in time-consuming 
59  SCHNABEL, T. The Singapore <…>, p. 20.
60  The negotiators on behalf of the EU were strictly against such overlap and would not agree on other provisions. A 
compromise led to finalisation of the Convention as a whole. See: SCHNABEL, T. The Singapore <…>, p. 20.
61  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 5., art 5. (1) a and b (i).
62  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 5., art 5. (1) e and f.
63  KESSEDIJAN, C. Médiations internationales: un nouvel instrument d’exécution de la CNUDCI. Recueil Dalloz, 
2017, no. 41, p. 2416. 
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disagreements. After all, the purpose of the contract concluded by the parties is to end the uncertainty 
and bring the end to the dispute64, not vice versa.
Hence, the Singapore Mediation Convention should have kept only three types of grounds for refusal. 
(1) That are primarily related to the compliance with the national law of the state where enforcement 
is sought as is the model in the Mediation Directive, namely concerns of public policy and the subject 
matter of the dispute not being capable of settlement by mediation under the law of the state where 
enforcement is sought65. (2) Those, that are clear from the text of an MSA without analysis of the facts, 
such as an MSA not being binding or final or being incomprehensible66. (3) Those, proving that the 
MSA is not relevant either because it was subsequently modified and parties can submit a proof of the 
same legal value as the initial mediated settlement agreement, or because the validity of the settlement 
agreement or fairness of the mediation process was subsequently challenged before a judicial authority 
in accordance with the rules of international jurisdiction.
To sum up, despite its scope of application limited to commercial disputes, the entry into force 
of the Singapore Mediation Convention will enshrine that mediation is completely voluntary up to 
the point of an MSA, however, once such agreement is reached parties are bound by their obligations 
and have to fulfill them. If not in good faith, then with an incentive from a public authority. This 
could, therefore, raise the overall credibility of the mediation process in the eyes of the general public 
and, subsequently, its popularity. Moreover, it could encourage states that do not yet have a national 
enforcement mechanism for MSAs in place to take steps in order to implement one. The Singapore 
Mediation Convention has the potential to work as successfully as the Mediation Directive in the EU, 
however, for such scenario to become more likely the provisions regulating the scope of application 
and grounds for refusal to grant relief could have been improved.
Conclusions
1.  SIAC – SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol is a wise choice to those who are not only looking for an 
enforceable outcome to their dispute but as well are keen to transfer their disagreement to arbitra-
tion in case mediation is not successful. The New York Convention that Arb-Med-Arb is based on 
is widely recognized, hence mediated settlement agreements transformed into consent awards can 
be easily enforced. However, it is not the best choice for those who are genuinely willing to solve 
their dispute in mediation as method proposed by SIAC-SIMC adds superfluous procedural steps, 
is costlier and obliges parties to resort to arbitration if mediation does not produce a satisfactory 
outcome. 
2.  Enforcement mechanism for mediated settlement agreements offered by the EU Mediation directive 
is, with rare exceptions, based on different national models of homologation. Even though it could be 
improved by waiving the additional requirement for subsequent consent from both parties upon the 
time of enforcement, it is working effectively throughout the member states. However, it is a regional 
solution, which is built on a number of prior regulations and mutual trust between the member states. 
Hence, it is unlikely that such model could work unchanged outside the borders of the EU.
3.  UNCITRAL’s Singapore Mediation Convention has the potential to offer a universal solution to 
the problem of enforcement of MSAs arising out of commercial disputes. However, trying to ac-
64  HOPT, K. J. et al. Mediation: Principles <…>, p. 45.
65  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 5., art 5. (1) e and f.
66  UNCITRAL General Assembly Note by the secretariat No. A/CN.9/942 <…>, p. 5., art 5. (1) b (ii) and c (ii).
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commodate needs of different legal systems and assure that the instruments are credible enough to 
attract contracting states, some provisions were drafted too rigidly or too extensively. Not excluding 
from the scope of the convention MSAs reached in the scope of judicial proceedings or arbitration 
and reducing the number of grounds for refusal to grant relief could improve the quality of the 
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Tarptautinių mediacijos būdu pasiektų susitarimų priverstinis vykdymas
Miglė Žukauskaitė
(Vilniaus universitetas)
S a n t r a u k a
Mediacija pagrįsta laisva šalių valia, todėl dažniausiai šiuo ginčų sprendimo būdu pasiektų susitarimų yra laikomasi. 
Vis dėlto ne visos šalys elgiasi sąžiningai ir gera valia vykdo prisiimtus įsipareigojimus. Rizika, kad mediacijos būdu 
pasiekus susitarimą teks teismo keliu siekti šio susitarimo vykdymo, mažina mediacijos patikimumą ir populiarumą. Dėl 
to tarptautinė bendruomenė pradėjo ieškoti būdų užtikrinti, kad tarptautiniai mediacijos būdu pasiekti susitarimai galėtų 
būti privalomai vykdomi. Šiuo metu galima rasti du tarptautinius dokumentus: SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb protokolą bei 
ES mediacijos direktyvą. Pirmasis siūlo inovatyvų sprendimą, paremtą Niujorko konvencija ir arbitro sprendimu patvir-
tinta taikos sutartimi. Vis dėlto šalims, norinčioms išskirtinai mediacijos būdu siekti susitarimo, šis metodas tik prideda 
bereikalingų procedūrinių žingsnių. Antrasis, numatytas ES mediacijos direktyvoje, yra grindžiamas nacionaliniais taikos 
sutarčių priverstinio vykdymo modeliais. Tačiau šis teisės aktas veikia tik ES. Be to, šis modelis yra pagrįstas ilgamečiais 
ES teisės aktais bei per sąjungos gyvavimo istoriją užtikrintu pasitikėjimu tarp jos narių, todėl pritaikytas tarptautiniu 
mastu gali nepasiekti to paties rezultato.
UNCITRAL priėmė iššūkį parengti universalų tarptautinių mediacijos būdu pasiektų susitarimų priverstinio vykdy-
mo mechanizmą, tačiau tik komercinių ginčų ribose. Šis siekis materializavosi į Singapūro mediacijos konvenciją. Šia 
konvencija pasirinktas modelis panašus į siūlomą ES mediacijos direktyvoje: jis remiasi nacionaliniais proceso įstatymais 
ir nesukuria unifikuoto sprendimo. Jei konvencija bus pakankamai populiari, ji gali išspręsti mediacijos būdu pasiektų 
susitarimų priverstinio vykdymo problemą tarptautiniu mastu. Vis dėlto būtinybė pasiekti sutarimą rengiant konvencijos 
tekstą bei siekis pritraukti kuo daugiau šalių lėmė keletą potencialių trūkumų. Be to, skirtingai nei ES, ne visų pasaulio 
valstybių nacionaliniai teisės aktai numato priverstinio vykdymo galimybes mediacija pasiektiems susitarimams. Tai gali 
sumažinti Singapūro mediacijos konvencijos veiksmingumą praktikoje. 
